INTRODUCTION
Comparative law can have the aim of making suggestions for law reform. Thus, the first meaning of the title of this article is that law-makers may bring in foreign legal ideas that are seen as beneficial in, for example, pursuing aims such as the advancement of economic development. But the title of this article also has a second meaning, namely that ideas may be 'foreign' because they originate from another discipline. This will be called 'implicit' comparative law (ICL). ICL is based on the understanding that today many other comparative disciplines, such as comparative politics, sociology and economics, deal with questions that compare and evaluate legal differences. However, this is not done under the heading of comparative law. Thus, it is not 'explicitly' treated as research on comparative law. 1 It is suggested that ICL is particularly suitable to help comparative lawyers in the quest for 'better law'. The reason for this is that those non-law comparative disciplines tend to be less hesitant than comparative law in making wide-reaching legal and policy recommendations based on cross-country comparisons. While such research has sometimes been criticised, it is the overall view of this article that the 'ICL better-law research' is valuable and should be incorporated into the discipline of comparative law. * Professor of Commercial Law, Durham University, and Research Associate, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge. I thank the participants of the Workshops on 'Interdisciplinary Study and Comparative Law' (London 7/13 and 2/14) for helpful comments. I also gratefully acknowledge funding from the Leverhulme Trust (Philip Leverhulme Prize 2010) for the underlying project on comparative law in context. 1 Note that ICL is different from the use of other disciplines as a conceptual tool to improve the method of comparative law. Further examples of ICL are discussed in Siems, M (2014) Comparative Law Cambridge University Press at 287-312. This article is structured as follows. The next section develops a general taxonomy for comparative research on 'better law'. On this basis, the subsequent three sections address the way in which ICL can contribute to this quest for better law, distinguishing between 'technically improved laws', 'laws meeting aims more successfully' and 'laws promoting new aims'. This will be based on examples from various academic disciplines, although it is not the ambition of this article to present a comprehensive treatment of such research. The concluding section provides further reflections on the relationship between comparative law and other disciplines.
THE QUEST FOR 'BETTER LAW' IN COMPARATIVE LAW
Comparative lawyers frequently discuss the aims of comparative law. 2 Often, one of those aims is to make suggestions on how the law can be improved. Explicitly, Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz suggest 'that the comparatist is in the best position to follow his comparative researches with a critical evaluation', and add that '(i)f he does not, no one else will do it', 3 Sir Basil Markesinis encourages us to 'increase intellectual interaction and borrowings'. 4 Others call for 'applied comparative law' or 'comparative legal diagnostics '. 5 In this article the terminology of 'better law' is borrowed from a controversial view in private international law. 6 The apparent problem is how to decide on what is 'better'. It is suggested that three broad categories, each with further subcategories, can be identified. First, comparative law may help to improve law 'technically'. This refers to the situation when, in particular circumstances, in two or more jurisdictions the law leads to a similar result. Such a view is typical for a functional-technical perspective of comparative law, in particular if it assumes a presumption of similar results (praesumptio similitudinis).
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There can be different reasons why in such a situation a jurisdiction may regard a foreign law as 'better'. It could be that this law provides more legal certainty, ie clearer legal rules and concepts, for instance, through codification. But it might also be the case that the foreign law is better able to balance different interests, if, for example, it employs general principles, with the details being left to the judiciary. In addition, such an approach may have the advantage that it is more adaptable to possible future developments. Finally, it may be advantageous to have legal rules which are close to the 'international mainstream'. The rationale may be that it can reduce the costs which arise from differences between legal systems. Another potential benefit is that moving towards the mainstream has the strategic aim of showing that a country wants to modernise its law, even if the actual results do not change much.
Second, the benefit may be that the 'better' law meets a particular aim or aims more successfully. This is based on -what can be called -'socio-legal functionalism', meaning the view that the purpose of a particular item of law is to address a particular problem or to pursue a particular policy. It can also be related to utilitarian perspectives which suggest that there is a certain aim, such as the maximisation of happiness, which the law should pursue. 8 The most intuitive case is that the transplanted institution may achieve the aim more fully. For example, a foreign rule may be better able to address a social problem. The decisive change may also be the provision of new institutional structures, such as better judicial enforcement. Alternatively, it is possible to compare the domestic with the foreign model in terms of costs and benefits. Thus, here, it would be considered that a foreign model might be more effective but also more costly, and that there may be switching costs when a country adopts a foreign model. Another variant of this category is to be concerned about the belief of the local population that a par-7 For this presumption see Zweigert and Kötz supra n 3 at 40. Third, the improvement may be that a foreign model triggers changes that pursue new aims, such as introducing a new social or economic policy or a re-balancing of group interests. This would be based on the socio-legal evolutionary view that the modernisation of societies and the modernisation of law go hand in hand. The main case is therefore that changes to legal rules have the aim to change society in a particular way.
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These changes may be geared towards new economic goals, but it can also be the case that the experience of other countries challenges the domestic law on ethical grounds.
11
It is also possible that the society has already changed. Thus, here, identifying 'better law' means that the foreign law better responds to those changed societal circumstances.
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Another variant is that the foreign law does not 'fit'; however, it is seen as useful to follow, because it can be given a new meaning which is beneficial for the latter country. For example, such a situation may occur in constitutional law, because constitutions have different functions in different political environments. 14 We are also told to 'celebrate plurality' and to reject the view of law as an instrument of solving problems. 15 Second, it is not seen as a task of comparative law to tell us which solutions work 'better' to meet a particular aim, but, rather, the aim is to get a better understanding of the world. This also relates to the view that legal rules are deeply embedded in their historical, social, cultural and economic context, preventing valid cross-cultural statements about the quality of legal rules. impossible to say that laws have a clear pre-determined causal effect. The third line of criticism is that claims about 'better law' are often patronising towards allegedly less developed societies. For example, the imposition of human rights on non-Western countries is sometimes seen as a 'neo-imperial' endeavour in promoting property rights that mainly benefit international companies and investors. 17 And more generally the reception of a foreign law may even be compared to 'the extinction of animal and plant species that results from the destruction of natural habitat'. 18 Thus, it seems that this internal debate among comparative lawyers about 'better law comparisons' has reached something of a dead end. The remainder of this article will therefore turn to other comparative disciplines (ie, ICL, see 1 above) in order to broaden and deepen our ability to assess legal models from different countries. As Table   1 indicates, this article suggests that ICL may be able to provide answers to a number of core questions of 'better-law comparisons'. This will be elaborated in the following sections.
ICL ON TECHNICALLY IMPROVED LAW
Recommendations for the technical improvement of law may be thought to lie primarily in the domain of comparative (and non-comparative) lawyers. However, ICL also has something to say about this topic. In particular, it can raise the question of whether such differences do not also play a substantive role, as the following two examples aim to illustrate. substantive (or informal), and on the other hand rational and irrational. 19 It was seen as damaging if a society was based on irrationality, be it formal (eg, using oracles) or informal (eg, deciding conflicts in an arbitrary way). With respect to rational regimes, Weber preferred the formality of rules to the informality of principles, values and traditions. These 'ideal types' were seen as related to different countries and regions: irrationality was associated with Asian and African cultures, for example, referring to Confucian ethics in China and the 'Khadi justice' of Islamic law. Informal rationality was associated with England, and formal rationality was seen as typical for the modern Roman-based codes of continental Europe which was then also associated with a successful capitalist economy.
Weber's view has been criticised for its dismissive treatment of non-Western laws, 20 but in the present context it is mainly of interest that other researchers regard case law as preferable. For example, law and economics scholars often claim that case law is more efficient than statute law, because it enables a decentralised, bottom-up construction of the legal order. 21 The argument is that, while civil and common law may often reach similar results, in the long run the case-law style of the common law leads to a legal system that is more adaptable than the civil law.
Economists have also tried to identify how such criteria could be measured. For example, Thorsten Beck and colleagues used three proxies for a variable on legal adaptability: 'complaint must be legally justified, judgment must be legally justified, and judgment must be on law (not on equity)'. 22 The result was that the law seemed to be more adaptable in common than in civil law countries. Yet, there are some problems with this line of reasoning. The extent of legal adaptability is not just dependent on the 19 The main work is Weber, M (1978) [1922] Economy and Society University of California Press. This summary is based on Siems, supra n 1 at 303. 20 role of courts. A more meaningful catalogue also needs to take into account the legislature, the lawyers and the general public of a particular place. If this is done, the situation is more ambiguous as to which legal family has an advantage in terms of adaptability. 23 Moreover, adaptability has to be balanced with legal certainty. This leads us back to Weber's reasoning and, in the current context, it has indeed been argued that civil law countries have an advantage in terms of legal certainty. 24 Second, even when the actual results are similar, one may well wonder whether it matters if the legal rules of a particular country are close to the international mainstream. Here, the argument in favour of uniform rules is that it can decrease the transaction costs arising from differences between legal systems. 25 The opposing view is that there is a benefit in diversity as it stimulates regulatory competition for better laws, ie a 'race to the top'.
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These topics have also attracted a good deal of research in economics and related disciplines. Some of it uses theoretical models in order to understand the costs and benefits of harmonisation and regulatory competition. 27 There has also been empirical research, for example, on the functioning and role of both of these themes in the US and its states, Canada and its provinces, and the EU and its Member States. ple, the rules on private international law. Economists, by contrast, tend to focus on other themes, for example, the role of information and switching costs, the incentives of both law-makers and users, and the relevance of path dependencies. 29 Thus, overall, ICL does not provide a clear answer about the right level of statute law and harmonisation. Yet, in both instances, it manages to show that those differences are not only of a technical nature. Thus, here already, we can see that comparative law can benefit from research in other disciplines. Even more so, this is the case for the topics of the following two categories.
ICL ON LAW WHICH MEETS AIMS MORE SUCCESSFULLY
The present section discusses whether comparative experience may be used to pursue a particular aim or aims more successfully. Unlike the discussion in the subsequent section, where comparative insights are used to promote new aims, it is assumed that this aim is not controversial. To be sure, this conceptual division is not always clear-cut. It can depend on the level of generality of whether aims are uncontroversial. For example, general aims such as promoting economic growth or maximising the happiness of all may be uncontroversial for the jurisdictions of a particular study. However, as lawmakers pursue more precise aims, it may then be controversial whether, say, growth in production or growth in financial markets is the jurisdictions' main economic aim.
It is suggested that ICL is particularly helpful in analysing the effect of the law from a comparative perspective, because in many non-law disciplines empirical data are more widely analysed than in legal research. The present section explains this research in three steps, while also addressing the difficulty of establishing clear causal relationships.
Foreign Experience on the Effects of Particular Legal Rules
Economists and other social scientists have conducted many quantitative comparative studies in order to establish which types of legal rules are 'best' -most conducive for 29 See, eg, the research cited in the previous two footnotes. financial development, for example. A well-known study by Rafael La Porta and colleagues coded the law on shareholder protection (as well as creditor protection) across 49 countries. 30 The strength of shareholder protection was based on an aggregate of six variables defined in a binary way. For instance, the variable on 'proxy by mail allowed' was said to 'equal[s] one if the company law or commercial code allows shareholders to mail the proxy vote to the firm, and zero otherwise.' La Porta et al then drew on these numbers as independent variables for statistical regressions, finding that good shareholder protection leads to more dispersed shareholder ownership, which can be seen as an indicator for developed capital markets. They also grouped the 49 countries into 'legal origins' (ie, legal families), with the result that common-law countries had the relatively strongest and French civil-law countries the weakest legal protection of share- Development, based at the University of Cambridge, conducted a more refined study of legal rules than the La Porta studies. However, the claim that the quality of the law is reflected in a country's financial development was only confirmed in some cases. 35 Another study conducted at the University of Bremen examined the conveyancing services market in the EU. This study managed to show that a higher degree of regulation has a negative effect on the choice, quality, certainty and speed of conveyancing services.
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This research about the causal effect of law has been highly influential, but also controversial. Some of the criticism relates to the construction of legal indices, the coding of legal rules and the aggregation of legal data. Often this line of criticism is related to specific studies. For example, La Porta et al's quantification of shareholder protection is frequently seen as flawed.
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There is also a more general problem of reducing the high complexity of the strength of shareholder protection (or other legal topics) across countries to mere numbers.
38
But this does not mean that such attempts cannot be made, as the experience of other disciplines shows that it is not impossible to quantify information on highly complex topics such as pollution levels, economic growth or intelligence.
A further contentious issue is whether it is possible to say that there is a clear link between law and financial development. Some empirical scholarship has suggested that other aspects such as politics, culture and capital account liberalisation are more important for financial development than legal rules.
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There is also the problem that, if there is causality, it can go the other way. 40 For instance, there are examples which show that it was only after the number of investors and the importance of the capital market was increased that shareholder protection was strengthened. 41 Yet, there are also ways to address this problem. For example, as far as time series data are available, it can be possible to identify the direction of causality.
In the present context, the main challenge is whether data showing that a particular model works 'best' really tells us that this model should be adopted. In reaction to the World Bank's Doing Business Report, a French group criticised the doing-business focus of the report, taking the view that law should aim 'to protect social peace and the citizens' freedom and will '. 42 Thus, the argument is that claiming to measure what works 'best' is only meaningful as far as countries follow the same aim. Apart from basic human needs, this is unlikely to be the case for a study that examines all countries of the world.
Insofar as countries do pursue the same aim, it is also not clear whether following the most successful model is always advisable. The research cited above is only able to show that, overall, a particular model works better than others. But in an individual case it may, given the association between legal rules and the social, economic and cultural context of the law, work quite differently than intended. 43 Thus, while such research can be a useful guidance, the apparent advantage of a foreign model should not be seen as providing law-makers with a blueprint that should simply be adopted without further reflections. 40 
Learning How Rules Can Be Better Enforced
Meeting common aims more successfully can also be achieved by improving the enforcement of the law. This refers not just to the role of courts but also to administrative bodies and other institutions. Apart from comparative legal research, other comparative disciplines have taken an interest in these topics. In particular, comparative politics has become more and more interested in the way state institutions work, including a shift from emphasising universal relationships to an emphasis on the role of context. 44 Sometimes it is possible to identify a common general aim which countries pursue in the design of such institutions. For example, comparative research on administrative practices often starts with the problem that rulers may be tempted to appoint friends, family members and political allies to positions of power. Thus, research in political science attempts to develop categories that can be used to compare the professionalism and effectiveness of bureaucracies. 45 One also needs to consider, though, that this 'Weberian' aim for a professional and politically neutral civil service may be supplemented (or substituted) by other aims. For instance, researchers today often distinguish bureaucracies which implement pre-defined programmes from those that aim for client satisfaction, consumer participation, conflict resolution and cost-effective results. 46 Similar problems arise if one wishes to identify 'the best' courts with quantitative cross-country data. However, such an evaluation is often attempted, and the World Bank even claims that '(m)easuring the performance of the various elements of the jus- 44 have incorporated two studies by Simeon Djankov and colleagues. These studies deal with the efficiency of courts and the regulation of entry of start-up firms across 109 and 85 countries respectively, in particular the speed of proceedings. In the article on courts this relates to the duration of trial and enforcement for hypothetical cases to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced cheque, and in the article on regulation of entry they examine the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. Finally, the view is taken that in both instances lengthy proceedings are harmful to the ease of doing business. 49 While the length of proceedings cannot be the only 'benchmark' that matters for the assessment of courts, it seems plausible that overly lengthy proceedings are harmful since they make the substantive rights underlying these proceedings obsolete. The problem is, though, that these substantive rights are often very diverse across countries. For example, the Djankov et al study, which uses court proceedings to evict a tenant as a starting point, is unsatisfactory because some countries have special laws to protect tenants. Such general comparisons of courts can, therefore, only be a valid basis for policy recommendations if they are limited to countries that have a comparable social structure and comparable substantive law on a particular issue.
Empirical research can also be revealing for the strength of other more specific enforcement institutions. For example, Howell Jackson and Mark Roe have challenged the view that it is good private enforcement of investor protection, but not good public enforcement, which stimulates financial market development. liability rules, and about as important as disclosure rules, in explaining financial outcomes. 51 The Jackson and Roe study was based on the plausible assumption that securities commissions have similar tasks, such as enforcing laws against insider dealing, securities fraud, financial disclosure violations and so on. However, it may be problematic to rely solely on 'input measures' such as staffing and budget. In the analysis of institutions, political scientists and economists often distinguish between input and output measures. 
Complicating the Assessment: Costs and Perceptions
Up to this point, it has been assumed in this section that it 'only' matters whether a particular law is better able to pursue a particular aim. But this is not the full picture. First, it seems likely that countries do not just want to assess the benefits of foreign models.
They also want to assess their costs. These may be 'switching costs', but they may also be permanent ones such as the side effects of substantive rules, or increased funding for improved enforcement institutions. Disciplines which are more quantitative than law can make an important contribution in assessing these costs and benefits.
Take the simple example of a stolen asset bought by a bona-fide purchaser.
Some jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, tend to protect the original owner of the stolen asset, whereas others, such as France, tend to protect the bona fide purchaser. Assuming economic efficiency as a common aim, we have to compare the costs generated by taking care of the asset with the costs for investigations of the ownership of the title.
This can enable us to say whether the French or the English solution is preferable. 53 Second, instead of relying on objective data, law-makers may consider the way in which the population subjectively perceives how well a particular aim is fulfilled.
Comparative survey methods are frequently used in the social sciences, and they are also an important tool for governments and other policy actors. 54 Some global surveys of this type provide interesting opportunities for further analysis. One such survey was conducted by Maksym Ivanyna and Anwar Shah, who constructed a 'citizen-centric governance index' based on data from the World Value Survey. 55 In another such survey, Bruno Deffains and Ludivine Roussey found that the level of trust in judicial institutions, as measured by the same survey, positively depends on public resources devoted to the judiciary. 56 The problem with comparative survey data is, however, that the answers may not be fully comparable across countries. There is the apparent risk that participants understand broad terms such as 'trust in the judiciary' in a dissimilar way, in particular when questions are drafted in different languages.
57
It is also said that participants are typically coloured by cultural differences and recent economic performance. 58 Moreover, participants may have their own agenda. For example, a 'loyal citizen could try to make his country look better than it really is, whereas a political activist striving for improvement might try to make his or her country look worse than it really is'. 
ICL ON LAW WHICH PROMOTES NEW AIMS
Since different jurisdictions pursue different aims, comparative lawyers are often not sure whether or how it can be said that the law of one jurisdiction is 'better' than the law of another jurisdiction. Other social sciences may acknowledge the same problem, but there is also a greater willingness to evaluate whether one of these aims is preferable. This section discusses three fields where this has been attempted. They relate to the: law of developing countries; models of capitalism and welfare law; and constitutional law. These are topics that, traditionally, have not been the core focus of comparative lawyers. Thus, it is suggested that ICL may be able to fill this gap, at least as far as it can present different policy options.
Economic Development, Human Development and Happiness
Today, a dominant narrative advises that law should aim to promote economic development. Economists in particular have shaped the current debate. For example, the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto claims that economic development depends on the formal protection of property, because informality tends to foster corruption and ineffi- 60 The most well-known set of combined indicators is that set out in Kaufmann, D; Kraay, A and guson also refer to the need for secure property rights, rules protecting investors and an effective judicial system if economic development is to take place. 63 Moreover, empirical work is said to have confirmed that those and related reasons 'matter', in particular 'institutions', 'governance' and the 'rule of law'. 64 However, a number of counter-arguments can be suggested. First, it is unrealistic to assume that there is only a unidirectional relationship between legal and non-legal factors.
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In particular, it is also possible that the society has already changed and that law is catching up with these developments.
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In the current context this is particularly relevant for the phenomenon of 'localised globalism', namely where local patterns change due to the impact of transnational imperatives, for example, if law-makers feel that they have to respond to the growing influence of multinational corporations. 67 Second, this view has been heavily criticised as far as it appears to suggest a blueprint for all countries of the world. The main objection is that this promotes a Western model that may not be suitable elsewhere. This line of criticism can refer to the legal context: for example, it may be said that there are 'different popular ideas in different countries about the purposes of law and what is to be expected from it', 68 and that 'prepacked reforms' tend to pay no attention to the way new and old law, including its legal culture and institutions, relate to each other. 69 It can also be said that the problem with imported Western law is that it may 'clash' with the society of the country in question, given that law does not exist in isolation of 'history, culture, human and material resources, religious and ethnic composition, demographics, knowledge, economic conditions, politics [etc]'. 70 However, it is clear that this would not convince someone who supports importing a foreign legal model if this model has precisely the aim to change the society in question.
Thus, third, the more substantive counter-argument is that economic development should not be the main aim. Some of the critical literature is fairly 'political', rejecting the 'capitalist' focus on privatisation, property rights and ease of doing business and the corresponding disregard of resource preservation and social rights. 71 But there are also more refined positions. A good example is the work by Amartya Sen, the winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1998. His suggestion is that of 'development as freedom', meaning that the main aim should be to enable everyone 'to be able to do and be'. It is also said that learning should not be asymmetrical. In particular, it should also include 'reverse learning' by Western legal systems from other parts of the world. 75 Another plausible response may be that legal rules should reflect both economic and non-economic aims. Such an approach seems to be taken by international organisations such as the UN, for example, in the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and in the Millennium Declaration. 76 However, it is also clear that not all aims are mutually reconcilable. This will also be apparent in the research discussed in the next section.
Welfare Models and Varieties of Capitalism
In the same way as comparative law classifies countries into legal families, other comparative social sciences have developed classifications which include topics that have a legal dimension. Often, these classifications are also seen as test cases concerning the preferability of the respective models. The following discusses two of these, partly overlapping, contemporary classifications that originate from research in comparative politics, political economy and social policy. 77 The first is the distinction between 'three worlds of welfare capitalism' by Gøsta Esping-Andersen. 78 These forms of capitalism are based on a variety of substantive policies such as pensions, sickness and unemployment benefits, and lead to a distinction between the liberal welfare systems of Anglo-Saxon countries, a conservativecorporatist category of most continental European countries, and the social-democratic Scandinavian countries. Subsequently, it has been argued that Mediterranean countries such as France and Spain deserve a separate category. 79 Also, if one adds countries of the developing world, further groups may be necessary, such as regimes of 'informal security' and 'insecurity'. 80 The second main classification derives from the 'varieties of capitalism' literature. According to Peter Hall and David Soskice 81 the main distinction is between liberal market economies such as the UK and the US on the one hand and coordinated (or organised) market economies such as Germany and Japan on the other. A typical feature of the former countries is the use of competitive markets, whereas the latter rely more on collaborative relationships. Within the group of coordinated market economies Hall and Soskice distinguish between countries with industry-based and group-based coordination. Others suggest further categories, for example, a category of governed market economies, such as today's China, 82 or three categories for the northern, western and southern countries of continental Europe. 83 The concept of 'institutional complementarities' plays an important role in understanding the varieties of capitalism. It suggests that the differences between these groups extend to many institutional features. For example, being a coordinated market economy is seen as related to strong employment protection, support of incremental innovation, sectoral training schemes, coalition governments and high levels of social welfare. 84 It is also thought that the varieties of capitalism distinction can explain conceptual differences in many areas of law, 85 civil law countries. 86 Specifically, Katharina Pistor and Curtis Milhaupt refer to differences in the degree of centralisation of law-making and enforcement, expecting more centralisation in civil than in common law countries. However, using case studies of individual countries they also show that regulatory responses to financial crises may depart from these different starting points. 87 The question remains whether identifying differences in capitalism -including their connections to other legal and non-legal themes -may lead one country to decide that it wants to follow the 'better' model of another country. Here a first consideration could be that, according to the political science literature, such a policy transplant does not work if countries are ideologically and psychologically incompatible. 88 Yet, researchers have also examined how changes occur, for example, how models of the welfare state have diffused within Europe, 89 how distinctions between welfare states have weakened (or strengthened) in recent times, 90 and how dynamic elements can be incorporated into an understanding of varieties of capitalism. 91 Thus, returning to a distinction made earlier in this article, 92 on the one hand it is possible that a jurisdiction deliberately wants to change its law in order to shift in its approach to welfare and capitalism. On the other hand, it is possible that the society has already changed. For example, it is conceivable that changes in corporate ownership structures shift a country closer to one or the other variant of capitalism: then, if the law-maker wants to follow, it may be advantageous to transplant the legal rules of a country where these changes have already occurred.
Forms of Government and Constitutional Design
Research which tries to classify forms of government goes back to Aristotle, who analysed the constitutions of Greek towns based on the number of rulers and the quality of governments, leading to three 'good' types (monarchy, aristocracy, polity) and three 'corrupt' ones (tyranny, oligarchy, democracy). Today, a well-known dataset derives from the Polity IV Project which provides world-wide information on political regimes, distinguishing between full democracy, democracy, open anocracy, closed anocracy, and autocracy. 93 Recently, another project has also established a dataset on varieties of democracy. 94 In the past, the question about the 'best' form of government has often led to the response that it all depends on the country in question. For example, in the 18th century Montesquieu famously suggested that constitutional structures should reflect the climate, geography, culture and character of a nation. 95 Today's research is less 'relativist'.
The use of quantitative data has led to the consensus view that there is a positive correlation between the level of democracy on the one hand and economic growth, security and safety on the other -though it is highly controversial whether this means that economic development stimulates democracy, or vice versa. 96 Current research has also refined the analysis. On the one hand, this concerns the need to examine different shades of democratic and non-democratic regimes. For instance, it is sometimes suggested that a 'benevolent autocracy' may be less problematic than a weak democracy. 97 On the other hand, research on 'constitutional engineering' 98 has tried to establish what impact specific choices have on the aims law-makers want to pursue. Take the following examples: 99 it is suggested that the extent to which a country is a 'consensus democracy' is associated with less violence and more extensive social welfare, 100 that parliamentarism is more conducive to stability and development than presidentialism, 101 and that proportional representation leads to larger government spending and more frequent political compromise than more majoritarian voting systems. 102 Studies have also looked at differences in the involvement of stakeholders in the law-making process, and how those may relate to laws favouring group interests. 103 For law-makers such research may show that they may be able to design constitutional rules in order to achieve particular aims. To be sure, here too, it needs to be considered that those general regularities will not work in every political and socioeconomic context. But, sometimes, it is possible that this 'merely' leads to a shift in the meaning of the rules. It can be observed that constitutions follow quite different aims: in the West it is primarily a legal document, in transition economies it may be more of an aspirational one, in countries with internal or external tensions it may aim to unite the country and strengthen the state, and in some developing countries it may mainly be used to please possible donor countries. 104 Thus, a country that adopts a constitutional rule of another country may well be aware that its operation will be different, but still see it as a useful model to follow.
CONCLUSION: BEYOND ACADEMIC SILOS
This article has taken the view that 'implicit comparative law' research can provide useful suggestions on how to improve legal rules and institutions. 'Implicit comparative law' (ICL) was defined as research from non-law disciplines which compares and evaluates legal differences. Mainstream comparative law largely ignores such research. As far as such research is considered, it is also frequently dismissed. For example, some of the quantitative work is just seen as too simplistic and insensitive towards the complexity of legal rules and the respect for foreign legal cultures.
However, such criticism may also be criticised for being insensitive towards the paradigms, methods and tools of other academic disciplines. It is understandable that a researcher may face something of a culture shock when she reads papers from other disciplines that do not follow the line of reasoning she has taken for granted. In particular, this is the case when, say, a legal scholar reacts to the bold statements made by economists, perhaps overlooking that these are just models constructed under certain assumptions or just hypotheses proposed to be tested. To be sure, it is not suggested that only legal scholars are at fault. In particular, some of the comparative work conducted by economists 105 would have benefitted from closer interaction with legal scholars.
All of this means that cooperation across disciplines should be strengthened. 
